

as the incentive for this fine action in the grand style, so as to attribute it to Christianity, should reflect that in the whole of the New Testament no word is spoken against slavery – though the practice was universal in those days too – and moreover that even in 1860 in North America, one man appealed in debates about slavery to the fact that Abraham and Jacob also kept slaves.<sup>41</sup>

What the practical results of that mysterious inner process will be in each individual case ethics may discuss in chapters and paragraphs about duties of virtue, or duties of love, or imperfect duties or whatever else. The root, the basis of all of that is the one expounded here, from which springs the principle: ‘Help everyone to the extent that you can’;<sup>a</sup> and from this all the rest is really easy to derive here, just as all duties of justice were from the first half of my principle, ‘Harm no one’.<sup>b</sup> Ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences, which is nothing other than what is to be expected, since it is incumbent on everyone<sup>c</sup> to construct it himself, even to derive the rule for each case as it occurs from the highest principle that is rooted in his heart: for few have the leisure and the patience to learn a ready constructed ethics. The collective virtues flow from justice and loving kindness, and so they are the cardinal virtues, with whose derivation the foundation stone of ethics is laid. – Justice is the entire ethical content of the Old Testament, and loving kindness that of the New: the latter is the ‘new commandment’<sup>d</sup> (John 13: 34) in which, according to Paul (Romans 13: 8–10), all Christian virtues are contained.

### *§19 Confirmations of the foundation of morals expounded*

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The truth we have now pronounced, that compassion, as the sole non-egoistic incentive, is also the only genuinely moral one, is paradoxical in a strange, and indeed an almost incomprehensible, way. So I will attempt to make it less alien to the reader’s convictions by showing it as confirmed by experience and by the utterances of universal human feeling.

1) To this end I want first of all to take an arbitrarily invented case as an example, which can serve as a decisive experiment<sup>e</sup> in this investigation. But so as not to make the matter easy for myself, I shall take not a case of loving kindness but an infringement of right, and indeed the strongest. – Take

<sup>a</sup> *omnes, quantum potes, juva*

<sup>b</sup> *Neminem laede*

<sup>c</sup> *Jeder die Obliegenheit hat*

<sup>d</sup> *καινη εντολη*

<sup>e</sup> *experimentum crucis*

two young people, Caius and Titus, both passionately in love, though each with a different girl, and say that each of them has a rival standing squarely in his way who has precedence because of external circumstances. Both are resolved to despatch their respective rival from this world, and both are completely safe from all discovery, even from any suspicion. But as each one individually approaches the closer organization of the murder, they both desist after a struggle with themselves. They are to give us an honest and clear account of the grounds for their abandoning their resolve in this way. – Now the account that Caius gives is to be placed entirely at the choice of the reader. He may perhaps have been held back by religious grounds, such as the will of God, the retribution to come, the future judgment and the like. Or he may say: ‘I reflected that the maxim of my conduct in this case would not have been suitable for yielding a universally valid rule for all possible rational beings, in that I would have treated my rival solely as a means and not at the same time as an end.’ Or he may say with *Fichte*: ‘Every human life is a means to the realization of the moral law:<sup>a</sup> therefore I cannot, without being indifferent to the realization of the moral law, destroy someone who is meant to contribute to that same law’ (*Moral Philosophy*,<sup>b</sup> p. 373). – (He could incidentally counter this scruple once in possession of his beloved, by hoping soon to produce a new instrument of the moral law.) – Or he may say, after *Wollaston*:<sup>c</sup> ‘I have deliberated that that action would be the expression of an untrue proposition.’ – Or he may say, after *Hutcheson*: ‘The moral sense, whose sensations, like those of any other sense, are not further explicable, determined me to refrain from it.’ – Or he may say, after *Adam Smith*: ‘I foresaw that my action would have aroused no sympathy at all for me in those who witnessed it.’ – Or, after *Christian Wolff*: ‘I recognized that in doing that I would be working against my own perfection and also not promoting anyone else’s.’ Or he may say, after *Spinoza*: ‘To a human being there is nothing more useful than a human being: therefore I was unwilling to kill a human being.’<sup>d</sup> – In short, he may say what you will. – But suppose *Titus*, whose account I reserve for myself, says: ‘As it came to the arrangements and I therefore had to occupy myself for the moment not with my passion but with that rival of mine, then it became fully clear to me for the first time what was really supposed to be happening to him now. But then compassion and

<sup>a</sup> *Sittengesetz*

<sup>b</sup> *Sittenlehre*

<sup>c</sup> *Wollastone*

<sup>d</sup> *Homini nihil utilius homine: ergo hominem interimere nolui* [see *Ethics* IV, prop. 18, scholium; also IV, prop. 35, corollaries]

pity<sup>c</sup> seized me, I felt sorry for him, I could not find the heart to do it: I was unable to do it.' – Now I ask every honest and unprejudiced reader: Which of the two is the better human being? – Which of the two would he rather assign his own fate to? Which of them was held back by the purer motive? – Where, accordingly, does the foundation of morals lie?

2) Nothing outrages our moral feeling in its deepest ground so much as cruelty. We can forgive every other crime, but cruelty alone we cannot. The ground for this is that cruelty is the direct opposite of compassion. If we are informed of a very cruel deed, as is, e.g., the one that the newspapers are reporting just now about a mother who murdered her five-year-old boy by pouring boiling oil down his throat and her younger child by burying it alive; or the one that is just reported from Algiers, that after a chance dispute and fight between a Spaniard and an Algerian, the latter, being the stronger, tore the other man's whole lower jaw bone clean off and carried it away as a trophy, abandoning him still alive – then we are seized with horror and cry out: 'How is it possible to do such a thing?' – What is the sense of this question? Is it perhaps: How is it possible to fear so little the punishments of the future life? – Hardly. – Or: How is it possible to act on a maxim that is so highly unsuited to becoming a universal law for all rational beings? – Certainly not. – Or: How is it possible to be so negligent of one's own perfection and that of others? – Equally not. – The sense of that question is quite certainly simply this: How is it possible to be so much without compassion? – Thus it is the greatest lack of compassion that impresses upon a deed the most profound moral reprehensibility and hatefulness. Consequently compassion is the real moral incentive. 233

3) The basis of morals and the incentive to morality<sup>a</sup> that I have presented is simply the only one that can boast of a real, and indeed an extensive efficacy. For surely no one will want to claim this for the remaining moral principles of philosophers, since they consist in abstract and sometimes hair-splitting propositions with no other foundation than an artificial combination of concepts, so that often their application to real acting would even have a ridiculous aspect to it. A good deed executed solely out of regard for the Kantian moral principle would, at bottom, be the work of a philosophical pedantry, or would amount to self-deception, with the agent's reason<sup>b</sup> interpreting a deed that had other, perhaps more noble incentives, as the product of the categorical imperative and the concept of duty that is supported by nothing. However, it is not only for

<sup>c</sup> *Erbarmen*

<sup>a</sup> *Grundlage der Moral und Triebfeder der Moralität*

<sup>b</sup> *Vernunft*

*philosophical* moral principles worked out on the basis of mere theory that a decisive efficacy can rarely be demonstrated, but even for *religious* ones that are put forward entirely for practical purposes. We see this first and foremost from the fact that, despite the great variety of religions on earth, the degree of morality, or rather immorality, shows not the least variety corresponding to it, but rather is in essence roughly the same everywhere.

234 Only we must not confuse crudeness and refinement with morality and immorality. The religion of the Greeks had an extremely slight moral tendency, virtually restricted to the oath, no dogma was taught and no morals publicly preached: but we do not see that as a result the Greeks, all things considered, were morally worse than the human beings of the Christian centuries. The morals of Christianity are of a much higher kind than those of the other religions that have ever appeared in Europe: but if anyone wished to believe therefore that European morality had improved to just the same extent and now at least excelled among its contemporaries, we would not only be able to convince him quickly that among Mohammedans, Guebres, Hindus and Buddhists at least as much honesty, loyalty, tolerance, gentleness, beneficence, nobility and self-denial is found as among the Christian peoples; but also the long catalogue of inhuman cruelties that have accompanied Christianity, in the numerous religious wars, the irresponsible crusades, the extermination of a large part of the native inhabitants of America and the population of that part of the world with negro slaves\* dragged there out of Africa, without right, or any semblance of right, torn away from their families, their fatherland, their part of the world and condemned to endless convict labour, in the unrelenting persecutions of heretics and inquisition courts that cry out to the heavens, in the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, in the execution of 18,000 Netherlanders by Alba, etc. etc. — would sooner assure a verdict to the detriment of Christianity. But overall, if we compare the splendid morals that Christianity and more or less every religion preaches, with the practice of its adherents, and imagine what this practice would come to if the worldly arm did not prevent crime, or indeed what we would have to fear if all laws were removed even for just one day, we shall have to confess

235 that the effect of all religions on morality is really very slight. The weakness of faith is to blame for this, to be sure. Theoretically, and so long as it goes no further than pious contemplation, everyone's faith appears strong to him. But the deed is the hard touchstone of all our convictions: if it

\* Even now, according to Buxton, *The African slavetrade*, 1839, their number is increasing yearly by about 150,000 fresh Africans, in whose capture and travel more than 200,000 others perish pitifully.

comes to the deed and faith is now to be tested by great renunciations and heavy sacrifices, then its weakness shows itself. If a human being is seriously meditating a crime, he has already broken through the barrier of genuine pure morality: after that the first thing that stops him every time is the thought of the law<sup>a</sup> and the police. If he shakes that off through the hope of eluding them, then the second barrier that confronts him is concern for his honour. But if he now gets over this defence as well, then, after the defeat of these two powerful resistances, one can bet a great deal against some religious dogma still having sufficient power over him to restrain him from the deed. For someone who is not deterred by close and certain dangers will hardly be held in check by remote dangers that rest merely on faith. Furthermore, it can still be objected against any good action that issued solely from religious convictions that it was not disinterested, but rather occurred out of concern for reward and punishment, and consequently has no purely moral worth. We find this insight expressed strongly in a letter by the famous Grand Duke Karl August of Weimar, where it says: 'Baron Weyhers was himself of the view that it must be a bad fellow who is good through religion, and not inclined to be so by nature. In wine there is truth<sup>a</sup>' (*Letters to J. H. Merck*, letter 229).<sup>42</sup> – Now consider by contrast the moral incentive I have expounded. Who would dare to deny for a moment that in all ages, among all peoples, in all life's circumstances, even in a state of lawlessness, even in the midst of the horrors of revolutions and wars, and in things great and small, every day and every hour, it manifests a decided and truly miraculous effectiveness, daily prevents many a wrong and calls into being many a good deed without any hope of reward and often quite unexpectedly, and that where it and it alone has been effective, all of us unconditionally grant the deed true moral worth with emotion and deep respect.

4) For boundless compassion with all living beings is the firmest and safest guarantor of moral good conduct<sup>b</sup> and requires no casuistry. Whoever is filled with it will reliably injure no one, infringe upon no one, bring woe to no one, and rather have consideration for everyone, forgive everyone, help everyone, as much as he is able, and all his actions will bear the imprint of justice and loving kindness. By contrast, try once saying: 'This human being is virtuous, but he knows no compassion.' Or: 'He is an unjust and wicked human being; yet he is very compassionate'; then the contradiction becomes palpable. – Tastes differ; but I know of no more beautiful prayer

<sup>a</sup> *Justiz*

<sup>a</sup> *In vino veritas*

<sup>b</sup> *sittliche Wohlverhalten*

than the one that ancient Indian dramas close with (as English dramas did in earlier times with one for the king). It goes: 'May all living beings remain free from pains.'

5) Even from particular characteristics it can be gathered that the true fundamental moral incentive is compassion. It is, e.g., equally as unjust to cheat a rich man as a poor man out of a hundred thalers by means of legal tricks that involve no danger: but the reproaches of conscience and the blame from impartial witnesses will turn out much louder and more vehement in the second case; thus Aristotle already says: 'it is more terrible to wrong the unfortunate than the fortunate',<sup>c</sup> *Problems*, XXXIX, 2.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand the reproaches will be even quieter than in the first case if it is a state treasury that one has defrauded, for this cannot be an object of compassion. It can be seen that it is not immediately the infringement of right that provides the material for one's own blame and that of others, but rather the suffering that is brought upon others in the process. The mere infringement of right as such, e.g. the one above against the state treasury, will indeed also be disapproved of by conscience and by others, but only in so far as the maxim of respecting *every* right, which makes the truly honest man, is thereby broken; so it will be disapproved of mediately and to a lesser degree. However, if it was a state treasury *entrusted to one's care*, then the case is a completely different one, in that the concept of *double injustice* established above applies here with its specific properties. On what has been discussed here rests the fact that the heaviest reproach made everywhere against greedy extortionists and legal rogues is that they have snatched the goods of widows and orphans for themselves: precisely because these people, being entirely helpless, should have aroused even more compassion than others. So it is the total lack of this that proves a human being's wickedness.

6) Compassion lies at the basis of loving kindness even more obviously than it does at the basis of justice. No one will receive evidence of genuine loving kindness from others so long as things are going well for him in every respect. Although the happy man can experience the good will of his relatives and friends in many ways, expressions of that pure, disinterested, objective sympathy for someone else's condition and fate that are the effect of loving kindness are reserved for one who is suffering in some respect or other. For we do not sympathize with the happy one *as such*; rather he

<sup>c</sup> δεινότερον δέ ἐστι τὸν ἀτυχοῦντα, ἢ τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀδικεῖν (*iniquius autem est, injuriam homini infortunato, quam fortunato, intulisse*) [950b3–4: the work *Problems* is a traditional part of the Aristotelian corpus whose authorship has been seriously doubted]

remains *as such* foreign to our heart: 'let him have his own for himself!'<sup>a</sup> In fact, if he has great advantage over others, he will provoke envy, which threatens to transform itself into *schadenfreude* should he one day fall from the height of happiness. However, this threat mostly remains unfulfilled and it does not come to the Sophocleian 'our enemies exult'.<sup>b</sup> For as soon as the happy man falls, there occurs in the hearts of the rest a great change of form, which is instructive for our study. It now becomes apparent first and foremost what kind of concern it was that the friends of his happiness had for him: 'Once the wine-jars are empty, friends disperse with the dregs.'<sup>c</sup> But, on the other hand, what he feared more than unhappiness itself and what he found unbearable to think of, the rejoicing of those who envied his happiness, the mocking laughter of *schadenfreude*, mostly fails to happen: envy is reconciled, it has disappeared along with its cause, and the compassion that now takes its place gives birth to loving kindness. The enviers and enemies of a happy man have often transformed themselves upon his fall into caring, consoling and helping friends. Who has not experienced something of the kind in himself, at least in weaker degrees, and has not seen with surprise, when hit by a misfortune, that those who hitherto betrayed the greatest coldness and even ill-will towards him now come to his side with unfeigned sympathy? For unhappiness is the condition of compassion and compassion the source of loving kindness. – 238  
Related to this observation is the remark that nothing mollifies our anger so quickly, even when it is just, than its being said of its object: 'He is an unhappy man.' For what rain is to fire, compassion is to anger. For this reason I advise anyone who would prefer not having something to regret, if he is inflamed with anger towards somebody, to think of inflicting a great suffering on him – he should vividly imagine that he had inflicted it on him already, see him now wrestling with his mental or bodily pains, or his distress and misery, and have to say to himself: that is my work. If anything is capable of damping down his anger, it is this. For compassion is the correct antidote to anger, and by means of that trick against oneself one anticipates, while there is still time,

compassion, whose voice makes its laws heard when we take revenge<sup>a</sup>. (Voltaire, *Sémiramis*, act 5, sc. 6.)

<sup>a</sup> *habeat sibi sua*

<sup>b</sup> γελῶσι δ' ἐχθροί (*rident inimici*) [Sophocles, *Electra*, line 1153]

<sup>c</sup> *diffugiunt cadis cum faece siccatis amici* [Horace, *Odes*, I, 35, 26]

<sup>a</sup>  
*la pitié, dont la voix,  
Alors qu'on est vengé, fait entendre ses lois.*

Our spiteful mood towards others is displaced by nothing so easily as when we take up a viewpoint from which they make a claim on our compassion. – Even the fact that parents as a rule love the sickly child most rests on the fact of his continually arousing compassion.<sup>44</sup>

7) The moral incentive I have expounded further proves itself as the genuine one through the fact that it also takes *animals* into its protection, who are cared for so irresponsibly badly in the other European moral systems. The alleged lack of rights<sup>b</sup> of animals, the delusion that our actions towards them are without moral significance, or, as it goes in the language of those morals, that there are no duties towards animals, is simply an outrageous crudity and barbarism of the Occident whose source lies in Judaism. In philosophy it rests on the assumption, in spite of all evidence, of the total differentiation between human being and animal, which, as is well known, was enunciated in the most decisive and strident way by *Descartes*, as a necessary consequence of his errors. For as the Cartesian–Leibnizian–  
 239 Wolffian philosophy was building up rational psychology out of abstract concepts and constructed an immortal ‘rational soul’,<sup>c</sup> the natural claims of the animal world manifestly ran counter to this exclusive privilege and patent of immortality for the human species, and nature, as on all such occasions, silently submitted its protest. Now the philosophers, troubled by their intellectual conscience, had to seek to support rational psychology by means of empirical psychology and hence had to make efforts to open up a monstrous chasm, an immeasurable distance between human being and animal, so as to present them as fundamentally distinct. *Boileau* already mocks such efforts:

Do the animals have universities?  
 Do we see the flowering of their four faculties?<sup>d,45</sup>

In the end the animals were not supposed to be able even to distinguish themselves from the external world and to have no consciousness of themselves, no I! Against such fatuous claims one only has to point to the boundless egoism that dwells in every animal, even the smallest and least, which adequately proves how much animals are conscious of their I as opposed to the world or the not-I. If this sort of Cartesian found himself between the claws of a tiger, he would become aware in the clearest manner

<sup>b</sup> *Rechtlosigkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *anima rationalis*

<sup>d</sup>

*Les animaux ont-ils des universités?  
 Voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre facultés?* [*Satires*, VIII, 165]



what a sharp distinction such a creature places between I and not-I. Corresponding to such sophistications of philosophers we find on the popular path the peculiarity of some languages, particularly the German, that they have quite specific words for the eating, drinking, being pregnant, giving birth, dying and corpses of animals, so as not to have to use those that designate these acts in human beings, and thus to conceal the complete identity of the thing beneath the diversity of the words. Since the ancient languages are not acquainted with such a duplicity of terms, but designate the same thing with the same words without embarrassment, that miserable trick is without doubt the work of European priestliness,<sup>a</sup> which in its profanity thinks it cannot go far enough in its denial and defamation of the eternal essence that lives in all animals; whereby it has laid down the basis for the hardness and cruelty to animals that is customary in Europe, and that a high Asiatic can regard only with just abhorrence. We do not encounter that unworthy trick in the English language, doubtless because the Saxons, as they conquered England, were not yet Christians. On the other hand there is an analogue of it in the peculiarity that in English all animals are of neuter gender<sup>b</sup> and so are represented by the pronoun *it*, just as lifeless things – which comes out as totally outrageous, especially in the case of primates, such as dogs, monkeys etc., and is unmistakably a priestly ruse to degrade animals to things.<sup>46</sup> The ancient Egyptians, whose whole life was dedicated to religious ends, interred the mummies of human beings and those of ibises, crocodiles etc. in the same tombs: but in Europe it is an abomination and a crime if the faithful dog is buried next to his master's resting place, where from time to time he awaited his own death, out of a loyalty and attachment of a kind not found in the human race.<sup>47</sup> – Nothing leads us more decisively to the recognition of the identity of what is essential in the appearance of the animal and that of the human being, than involvement with zoology and anatomy: so what should we say when in this day and age (1839) an over-pious zootomist<sup>c</sup> has the impudence to urge a radical difference between human beings and animals, and goes so far as to attack and denigrate honest zoologists who, far from all priestery, eye-service and Tartuffianism, pursue their path under the guidance of nature and truth?

<sup>a</sup> *Pfaffenschaft*

<sup>b</sup> *generis neutrius*

<sup>c</sup> [The reference is to Rudolph Wagner, physiologist and anthropologist, professor at Erlangen and Göttingen. See Schopenhauer's letter to Frauenstädt, 12 Sept. 1852, in *GB*, 294 (and notes on 570–1)]

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Anyone must truly be blind in all senses, or totally chloroformed by the Judaic stench,<sup>a</sup> not to recognize that<sup>48</sup> what is essential and foremost in the animal and in the human being is the same, and that what distinguishes the two does not reside in what is primary, in the principle, in the original,<sup>b</sup> in the inner essence, in the core of both appearances, which in the one case as in the other is *the will* of the individual, but rather solely in what is secondary, in the intellect, in the degree of the cognitive faculty, which in the human being is far higher because of the additional capacity for *abstract* cognition, called *reason* – though demonstrably only because of a greater cerebral development, in other words the somatic difference of one single part, the brain, and in terms of its quantity in particular. By contrast, what is similar between animal and human, both psychologically<sup>c</sup> and somatically, is incomparably more. We have to remind such an occidental, judaized<sup>49</sup> despiser of animals and idolater of reason that, just as *he* was suckled by his mother, so too was the dog by *his* mother. That even *Kant* fell into this fault of his contemporaries and compatriots is a charge I have made above. That the morals of Christianity pay no regard to animals is a deficiency in them that it is better to admit than to perpetuate, and something we must be all the more surprised at, given that these morals otherwise show the greatest agreement with those of Brahmanism and Buddhism, merely being less strongly expressed and not carried through to extremes; thus we can scarcely doubt that, as with the idea of a god become human being (avatar), they stem from India and may have come to Judaea by way of Egypt – so that Christianity would be a reflection of the original light of India from the ruins of Egypt, which, however, fell unfortunately on Jewish soil. As a nice *symbol* of the deficiency we have just rebuked in Christian morals, despite its otherwise great agreement with Indian morals, we could take the circumstance that John the Baptist appears wholly in the manner of an Indian sannyasi, yet at the same time – dressed in an animal skin! which, as is well known, would be an abomination to any Hindu, since the Royal Society in Calcutta even acquired its copy of the Vedas only under the promise that it would not have it bound in leather according to the European manner: hence it can be found in its library bound in silk. A similar, characteristic contrast is provided by the gospel story of Peter's draught of fish, which the Saviour, by a miracle, blesses in such measure that the boats become overfilled with fish to the point of sinking (Luke 5), compared with the story of Pythagoras the initiate in Egyptian

<sup>a</sup> *foetor Judaicus*

<sup>b</sup> *im Archäus*

<sup>c</sup> *psychisch*

wisdom, who purchases the fishermen's catch from them while the net is still under the water, so as to grant all the caught fish their freedom afterwards (Apuleius, *Discourse On Magic*, p. 36<sup>a</sup>).<sup>50</sup> – Compassion for animals goes together with goodness of character so precisely that we can confidently assert that anyone who is cruel to animals cannot be a good human being. This compassion also shows that it is sprung from the same source as the virtue that is to be practised towards human beings. Thus, e.g., when persons of refined feeling recall that in a foul mood, in anger, or inflamed by wine, they mistreated their dog, their horse, their monkey in an undeserved or unnecessary way, or to excess, they sense the same remorse, the same dissatisfaction with themselves as is sensed at the recollection of injustice performed against human beings, where it is called the voice of punishing conscience. I recall having read that an Englishman who had shot a monkey on a hunt in India had not been able to forget the look the monkey gave him in dying, and never shot at monkeys again after that. Likewise William Harris, a true Nimrod, who in 1836 and 1837 travelled deep into the interior of Africa solely to enjoy the pleasures of the hunt. In the book of his travels that appeared in Bombay in 1838 he recounts that after he had bagged the first elephant, which was a female, and sought out the fallen animal the following morning, all other elephants had fled the area: only the fallen elephant's young one had spent the night with its dead mother, and now, forgetting all fear, it came towards the hunters giving the liveliest and clearest testimony of its inconsolable misery, and embraced them with its little trunk so as to call on their help. Then, says Harris, true remorse for his deed seized him and it felt to him as if he had committed a murder. We see this fine-feeling English nation distinguished before all others by a striking compassion for animals that manifests itself at every opportunity and has had the power to move the nation, despite the 'cold superstition'<sup>b</sup> that otherwise degrades it, to fill by legislation the loophole that religion leaves in morals. For precisely this loophole is the cause of animal protection societies being needed in Europe and America, which themselves can be effective only with the help of the law and the police. In Asia the religions grant animals adequate protection, so there no one thinks of societies of this sort. Meanwhile in Europe too the sense of the rights of animals is awakening more and more, in proportion as the strange conceptions of an animal world come into existence merely for the benefit and amusement of human beings, as a consequence of which

<sup>a</sup> *Apul. de magia*, p. 36. Bip. [Schopenhauer refers to the Bipont edition]

<sup>b</sup> [This according to Prince Pückler, in *Briefe eines Verstorbenen* (*Letters of a Dead Man*)]

they treat animals just as things, are gradually fading and disappearing. For these are the source of the crude and inconsiderate treatment of animals in Europe, and I have shown their origin in the Old Testament in the second volume of *Parerga*, §177.<sup>51</sup> To the glory of the English let it also be said that it was in their case that the law first seriously took animals into protection against cruel treatment, and that the villain must really pay the penalty for having committed a crime against animals, even if they belong to him.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, not content with that, there exists in London a voluntarily convened society, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, which, with a significant expenditure, does a great deal to work against the torture of animals in a private capacity. Its emissaries keep watch secretly, to emerge later as denouncers of those who torment sensate beings that lack language, and their presence is to be feared everywhere.\* At steep  
 244 bridges in London the Society keeps a team of horses which are put in front of any heavily loaded carriage free of charge. Is that not fine? Does it not compel our applause as much as a good deed towards human beings? Also, for their part the Philanthropic Society in London put up a prize of 30 pounds in 1837 for the best exposition of moral grounds against the torment of animals, though they were supposed to be taken chiefly from Christianity, which frankly made the task harder: the prize was awarded to

\* How seriously the matter is taken is shown by the following very fresh example that I translate from the *Birmingham Journal* of December 1839: 'Arrest of a society of 84 dog-fighters. – Since it had been discovered that a dog-fight was to take place according to plan in Fox Street in Birmingham, the Society of the Friends of Animals took preventive measures to ensure the help of the police, of whom a strong detachment marched to the site of the fight and, as soon as they were admitted, arrested the entire company present. These participants were then bound together in pairs with handcuffs and all of them collected in the middle with a long rope: in this way they were led to the police station, where the mayor held a sitting with the magistrate. The two ring-leaders were each sentenced to a punishment of 1 pound sterling together with 8½ shillings costs, and in case of non-payment 14 days' hard labour in prison. The rest were released.' – The dandies, who tend never to be missing from such noble pleasures, will have looked very embarrassed in the procession. – But we find an even more strict example from recent days in the *Times* of 6 April 1855, p. 6, one moreover held up as such by the newspaper itself. For it reports the case that came to court, of the daughter of a very well-to-do Scottish baronet who had tormented her horse extremely cruelly, with club and knife, for which she was sentenced to a punishment of 5 pounds sterling. But a girl of that kind thinks nothing of that, and would actually have skipped away from there unpunished, had not the *Times* followed up with the correct, sensitive chastisement, by displaying the girl's first and last name twice in large letters and continuing: 'We cannot but say that a few months' imprisonment, with a few private whippings administered by the stoutest woman in Hampshire, would have constituted a much more fitting punishment for Miss *N. N.* [in fact Emilie Frances Gordon]. Such a wretch is not entitled to privileges and honour due to her sex: we cannot think of her as a woman.'<sup>53</sup> – I dedicate these newspaper reports especially to the associations against the torture of animals now established in Germany, so that they see how one must attack the issue if anything is to come of it; though I pay my full acknowledgement to the praiseworthy zeal of Councillor Perner in Munich who has devoted himself entirely to this branch of beneficence and spread the initiative for it throughout the whole of Germany.<sup>54</sup>

Mr. Macnamara in 1839. In Philadelphia there exists, to similar ends, an Animals Friends Society. T. Forster (an Englishman) dedicated his book *Philozoia, moral reflections on the actual condition of animals and the means of improving the same* (Brussels, 1839) to the president of that society. The book is original and well written. As an Englishman, the author naturally seeks to rest his admonitions to humane treatment of animals on the Bible, yet strays all over the place; so that he finally resorts to the argument that Jesus Christ was after all born in the stable with the little oxen and asses, which is supposed to indicate symbolically that we have to regard animals as our brothers and treat them accordingly. – Everything adduced here gives evidence that the moral chord in question is gradually beginning to sound in the occidental world as well. Incidentally, compassion for animals must not lead so far that we, like the Brahmans, should have to refrain from animal food. This rests on the fact that in nature the capacity for suffering keeps pace with intelligence; which is why human beings would suffer more by renouncing animal food, especially in the North, than animals would by a quick and always unforeseen death, which should, however, be alleviated still more by means of chloroform. On the other hand, without animal food the human race would not even be able to survive in the North.<sup>55</sup> By the same criterion human beings also have animals to work for them, and only the excess of strain imposed on them turns into cruelty.

8) If for once we disregard altogether any metaphysical investigation that might perhaps be possible into the ultimate ground of that compassion from which alone non-egoistic actions can proceed, and consider it from the empirical standpoint, simply as an establishment of nature; then it will be apparent to everyone that, for the best possible alleviation of the countless sufferings of many forms to which our life is exposed and which no one escapes, and at the same time as a counter-weight to the burning egoism that fills all beings and often transforms into malice – nature could achieve nothing more effective than planting in the human heart that wondrous disposition by which the suffering of the one is felt as well<sup>a</sup> by the other, and from which comes the voice that loudly and intelligibly calls out ‘Care!’ to this one, ‘Help!’ to that, according to what the occasion is. For certain, more was to be hoped for towards the welfare of all from the mutual assistance that arose from this source, than from a universal, abstract, strict commandment of duty resulting from certain considerations of reason and combinations of concepts. Success was to be expected all the less from the latter, given that universal propositions and abstract truths are

<sup>a</sup> *mitempfinden*

wholly incomprehensible to the unrefined human being, because for him only what is concrete is something – but the whole of humanity, with the exception of an extremely small portion, was always unrefined and must remain so, because the great amount of bodily labour that is unavoidably necessary for the whole does not permit the edification of the mind. By contrast, for awakening compassion, which has been proved as the *sole source of disinterested actions and consequently as the true basis of morality*, no abstract cognition was required, but only intuitive cognition, the simple grasp of the concrete case, to which compassion responds at once without further mediation of thought.

9) We will find the following circumstance in complete agreement with the last consideration. The grounding I have given to ethics does indeed leave me without predecessors among the school-philosophers, and it is even paradoxical in relation to their doctrinal views, seeing that many of them, e.g. the Stoics (Seneca, *On Clemency*,<sup>b</sup> II, 5), Spinoza (*Ethics*, IV, prop. 50), Kant (*Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 213/*R.* p. 257<sup>c</sup>), reject and disparage compassion outright. On the other hand, my grounding has in its favour the authority of the greatest moralist of the entire modern age: for this is, without doubt, J. J. Rousseau, the profound knower of the human heart, who drew his wisdom not from books but from life, and who meant his teachings not for the professorial chair but for humanity – he, the enemy of prejudice, the pupil of nature, on whom alone it bestowed the gift of being able to moralize without being boring, because he hit upon the truth and stirred the heart. So I will allow myself to present some passages of his in corroboration of my viewpoint, having been as sparing as possible with citations up till now.

247 In the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*,<sup>a</sup> p. 91 (Bipont edition), he says: ‘There is another principle which has escaped Hobbes; which, having been bestowed on mankind, to moderate, on certain occasions, the ferocity of his self-love, tempers the ardour with which he pursues his own welfare, by an *innate repugnance at seeing someone like himself suffer*. I think I need not fear contradiction in holding man to be possessed of *the only natural virtue*, which could not be denied him by the most violent detractor of human virtue. I am speaking of *compassion* etc. . . . p. 92: Mandeville well knew that, in spite of all their morals, men would never have been better than monsters, had not nature bestowed *compassion* on them to aid their reason: but he did not see that *from this quality alone flow all those*

<sup>b</sup> *De clem[entia]*

<sup>c</sup> [Ak. 5: 118]

<sup>a</sup> *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité* [*Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*]

*social virtues, of which he denied man the possession.* But what is generosity, clemency or humanity but *compassion* applied to the weak, to the guilty, or to the human species in general? Even benevolence and friendship are, if we judge rightly, only the productions of a constant compassion fixed upon a particular object: for what is desiring that another person may not suffer other than desiring that he be happy? . . . Commiseration must, in fact, be the stronger, the more *the animal looking on* identifies himself *with the animal that suffers*. . . p. 94: It is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling, which, by moderating the activity of love of self in each individual, contributes to the mutual preservation of the whole species. It is this which in a state of nature supplies the place of laws, morals and virtues, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice: it is this which will always prevent a sturdy savage from robbing a weak child or a feeble old man of the sustenance they may have acquired with pain, if he hopes to be able to provide for himself by other means: it is this which, instead of inculcating that sublime maxim of rational justice “Do to others as you would have them do unto you”, inspires all men with that other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect indeed, but perhaps more useful “Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others”. In a word, it is *rather in this natural feeling than in any subtle arguments that we must look for the cause of that repugnance, which every man would experience in doing evil*, even independently of the maxims of education.<sup>b</sup> Compare

<sup>b</sup> *Il y a un autre principe, que Hobbes n'a point aperçu, et qui ayant été donné à l'homme pour adoucir, en certaines circonstances, la féroce de son amour-propre, tempère l'ardeur qu'il a pour son bien-être par une répugnance innée à voir souffrir son semblable. Je ne crois pas avoir aucune contradiction à craindre en accordant à l'homme la seule vertu naturelle qu'il ait été forcé de reconnaître le détricateur le plus outré des vertus humaines. Je parle de la pitié etc. — S. 92: Mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur morale les hommes n'eussent jamais été que des monstres, si la nature ne leur eut donné la pitié à l'appui de la raison: mais il n'a pas vu, que de cette seule qualité découlent toutes les vertus sociales, qu'il veut disputer aux hommes. En effet qu'est-ce que la générosité, la clémence, l'humanité, sinon la pitié appliquée aux faibles, aux coupables, ou à l'espèce humaine en général? La bienveillance et l'amitié même sont, à le bien prendre, des productions d'une pitié constante, fixée sur un objet particulier; car désirer que quelqu'un ne souffre point, qu'est-ce autre-chose, que désirer qu'il soit heureux? — La commiseration sera d'autant plus énergique, que l'animal spectateur s'identifiera plus intimement avec l'animal souffrant. — S. 94: Il est donc bien certain, que la pitié est un sentiment naturel, qui, modérant dans chaque individu l'amour de soi-même, concourt à la conservation mutuelle de toute l'espèce. C'est elle, qui dans l'état de nature, tient lieu de lois, de mœurs et de vertus, avec cet avantage, que nul ne sera tenté de désobéir à sa douce voix: c'est elle, qui détournera tout sauvage robuste d'enlever à un faible enfant, ou à un veillard infirme sa subsistance acquise avec peine, si lui même espère pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs: c'est elle, qui au lieu de cette maxime sublime de justice raisonnée “fais à autrui comme tu veux qu'on te fasse”, inspire à tous les hommes cette autre maxime de bonté naturelle, bien moins parfaite, mais plus utile peut-être que la précédente “fais ton bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est possible”. C'est, en un mot, dans ce sentiment naturel plutôt, que dans les arguments subtils, qu'il faut chercher la cause de la répugnance qu'éprouverait tout homme à mal faire, même indépendamment des maximes de l'éducation.* [Emphasis is Schopenhauer's throughout, and he has also made some unmarked omissions of text]



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with this what he says in *Emile*, Book IV, pp. 115–20 (Bipont edition), where among other things we find: ‘Indeed, how can we let ourselves be stirred by compassion unless we go outside ourselves, and *identify ourselves with the suffering animal, by leaving, so to speak, our being and taking his?* We suffer only in so far as we judge that he suffers; *it is not in ourselves, it is in him that we suffer.* . . . present to the young man objects on which the expansive force of his heart may take effect, objects which dilate it, which extend it to other beings, which make him *find himself outside himself*; carefully remove everything that narrows, concentrates, and strengthens the power of the human I etc.’<sup>a</sup>

Deprived, as I have said, of authorities on the part of the Schools, I add that the *Chinese* assume five cardinal virtues (*chang*), among which compassion (*sin*) heads the list. The remaining four are: justice, politeness, wisdom and uprightness.\* Correspondingly among the Hindus also we see compassion for human beings and animals occupying first place among the virtues that deceased princes are famed for on memorial plaques erected to their memory. In Athens compassion had an altar in the forum: ‘The Athenians have an altar to Compassion in the marketplace, to whom more than all the gods the Athenians uniquely among the Greeks pay tribute, as beneficial to human life and the changes in things’<sup>b</sup> (Pausanias I, 17, 1). Lucian also mentions this altar in *Timon*, §99. – A saying of Phocion preserved for us by Stobaeus portrays compassion as the holiest of all things in the human being: ‘The altar is not to be taken from the temple, nor compassion from human nature.’<sup>c</sup> In the *Wisdom of the Indians*,<sup>d</sup> which

\* *Journale Asiatique*, vol. 9, p. 62, to be compared with *Meng-Tseu* [Mencius], ed. Stan. Julien, 1824, Book I, §45; also *Meng Tseu in Livres sacrés de l’Orient* [Sacred Books of the Orient] by Pauthier, p. 281.

<sup>a</sup> *En effet, comment nous laissons-nous émouvoir à la pitié, si ce n’est en nous transportant hors de nous et en nous identifiant avec l’animal souffrant; en quittant, pour ainsi dire, notre être, pour prendre le sien? Nous ne souffrons qu’autant que nous jugeons qu’il souffre: ce n’est pas dans nous, c’est dans lui, que nous souffrons.* – — offrir au jeune homme des objets, sur lesquels puisse agir la force expansive de son cœur, qui le dilatent, qui l’étendent sur les autres êtres, qui le fassent partout se retrouver hors de lui; écarter avec soin ceux, qui le resserrent, le concentrent, et tendent le ressort du moi humain etc. [Emphasis is Schopenhauer’s throughout, and he has also made some unmarked omissions of text]

<sup>b</sup> Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐστὶ Ἑλέου βωμός, ᾧ μάλιστα θεῶν, ἐς ἀνθρώπινον βίον καὶ μεταβολὰς πραγμάτων ὅτι ὠφέλιμος, μόνοι τιμὰς Ἑλλήνων νέμουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι. (*Atheniensibus in foro commiserationis ara est, quippe cui, inter omnes Deos, vitam humanam et mutationem rerum maxime adjuvanti, soli inter Graecos, honores tribuunt Athenienses*)

<sup>c</sup> οὐτε ἐξ ἱεροῦ βωμόν, οὔτε ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀραιρετέον τὸν ἔλεον (*nec aram e fano, nec commiserationem e vita humana tollendum est*) [*Anthology*, I, 31]

<sup>d</sup> *Sapientia Indorum*



is a translation of the Pancha Tantra, we find (sect. 3, p. 220): 'It is said that pity is the first of the virtues.'<sup>c</sup> It can be seen that all ages and lands have recognized the source of morality perfectly well; only Europe has not – for which the Judaic stench<sup>f</sup> is solely to blame that here permeates all and all. And then there simply must be a commandment of duty, a moral law, an imperative, in short an order and command that is obeyed; they do not diverge from this and are unwilling to see that this kind of thing always has egoism alone as its basis. In isolated and reflective cases the felt truth has indeed announced itself: thus with Rousseau, as presented above; and Lessing too, in a letter of 1756, says: 'The most compassionate human being is the best human being, the most disposed to all social virtues and to all sorts of magnanimity.'<sup>g</sup>

## §20 On the ethical difference of characters

The final question, answering which belongs to the completeness of the foundation of ethics I have presented, is this: What does the very great difference in the moral conduct of human beings rest on? If compassion is the fundamental incentive of all genuine, i.e. disinterested justice and loving kindness, why is the one and not the other moved by it? – Is ethics perhaps capable, on uncovering the moral incentive, of also putting it into action?<sup>g</sup> Can it re-fashion the hard-hearted human being into a compassionate one, and thereby into a just and loving, kind one? – Certainly not: the difference of characters is inborn and ineradicable. The malicious man's malice is born in him as the venomous teeth and venom sac are in the snake; and he can alter it no more than the snake. 'Willing is not taught,' said the educator of Nero.<sup>a</sup> *Plato* investigates thoroughly in the *Meno* whether virtue can be taught or not: he adduces a passage in *Theognis*:

but by teaching you will never make a bad man good.<sup>b</sup>

and arrives at the result: 'virtue would be neither by nature nor taught, but comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods which is not

<sup>c</sup> Λέγεται γὰρ, ὡς πρώτη τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡ ἐλεημοσύνη (*princeps virtutum misericordia censetur*)

<sup>f</sup> foetor Judaicus

<sup>g</sup> Thätigkeit

<sup>a</sup> Velle non discitur [Seneca, *Letters*, 81, 14]

<sup>b</sup>

ἀλλὰ διδάσκων

Οὔποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἀνδρ' ἀγαθόν.

(sed docendo nunquam ex malo bonum hominem facies) [*Meno* 96a]